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Abstract This paper analyzes the role of propaganda use in cyberterrorism. The
main premise is that cyberterrorists display various semiotic gestures (e.g., the use
of images and Internet videos) to communicate their intents to the public at large.
In doing so, they communicate themes—these themes range from hate to anger.
Cyberterrorism, then, is a form of theater or spectacle in which terrorists exploit
cyberspace to trigger feelings of panic and overreaction in the target population. In
many cases, this form of propaganda is the primary means of communication for
various cyberterrorist groups to convey their intents. Internet sites also produce
numerous opportunities for in-group communication and publicity.
1 Introduction
In this paper, the role of propaganda use in cyberterrorism is being analyzed. The
main premise is that cyberterrorists display various propagandist gestures (e.g.,
through the use of images and Internet videos) to communicate their intents to the
public at large. In doing so, they communicate themes—these themes range from
hate to anger. Cyberterrorism, then, is a form of theater or spectacle in which
terrorists exploit cyberspace to trigger feelings of panic and overreaction in the
target population. In many cases, this form of propaganda is the primary means of
communication for various cyberterrorist groups to convey their intents. Internet
sites also produce numerous opportunities for in-group communication and
publicity. This analysis fills a gap in research on both propaganda and
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cyberterrorism in that the vast majority of studies on terrorism propaganda, so far,
have focused on traditional terrorism, but very little on cyberterrorism (Steuter and
Wills 2009).
In this analysis, the first section offers general perspectives on cyberterrorism. As
such, the authors describe cyberterrorism, its origins, and the various forms and
techniques used by cyber attackers. Also provided in this section is a short
explanation of the function of semiotics in cyberterrorism. What comes subse-
quently is the heart of the present analysis: an examination of propaganda use in
cyberterrorism. It begins with historical perspectives of propaganda use; then, it
delves into specific cases of propagandist gestures with respect to cyberterrorist acts.
For instance, following the London bombings in 2005, ‘‘The Martyrdom Will of
Mohammad Sidique Khan’’ became a viral video launched by a Muslim
cyberterrorist group. Another example is that of Irhabi007, an attacker playing
cat-and-mouse games with authorities through his websites. The next-to-last section
of this analysis examines a case study of cyberterrorist propaganda—specifically, a
propagandist act of the World Fantabulous Defacers (WFD)—by using semiotics
and explains how the cyberterrorist act works both as a symbol and as terrorism.
This analysis ends with a discussion section that also offers suggestions for future
research.
1.1 General perspectives on cyberterrorism
This section describes cyberterrorism, the origin of the word and the various forms
and techniques used by cyber attackers. It also provides a short explanation of the
function of semiotics in cyberterrorism.
1.1.1 Cyberterrorism: definition
In order to understand the full scope of how destructive and powerful cyberterrorism
can be, it is important to gain a basic understanding of the actual word. The word
‘‘cyberterrorism’’ comes from the portmanteau of ‘‘cyberspace’’ (i.e., the makeup of
data, algorithms, and computer networks) and ‘‘terrorism’’ (i.e., premeditated,
politically motivated violence committed against innocent persons or noncomba-
tants) (Conway 2002; Deutsch 1997). Cyberterrorism, in and of itself, is a method of
attack designed to damage, tamper with, or destroy critical points of national
infrastructure by controlling and manipulating computer networks (Denning 1999,
2000; Libicki 2009; Sloan 2006). The prefix ‘‘cyber’’ suggests that this type of
terrorism occurs throughout cyberspace and is, in turn, accessible through
computers (Conway 2002). The basic premise of traditional terrorism is the threat,
or the actual use of violence against people or property, with the intention of
inflicting enough harm to garner attention, create fear, and influence decision-
making (Sloan 1981). A different concept than conventional crime, terrorism has
roots in strong ideological motives, often with a goal of imposing principles and
beliefs by illegal and violent means (Axelrod and Nicoletti 2009).
Though most instances of cyberterrorism occur through Internet use, it is
important to recognize that the lesser utilized mechanisms of the telephone also play
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a role in conducting denial-of-service attacks (i.e., D.O.S. attacks), which render
computer networks inaccessible, inoperable, or ineffectual, thus easing the
transmission and distribution of propaganda by the attacker (Howard 2009). One
such example of a D.O.S. attack would be a victim who is injured attempting to get
help by dialing 911, only to be met with continuous dropped phone calls or just a
dead line (Brown 2006). In causing attacks, a cyberterrorist has access to any given
nation vulnerable to attacks of a grand scale. What this means is that irreparable
damage can be caused due to a nation’s heavy reliance on critical infrastructure that
is rooted in computer networks (Lewis 2002). Using a universal weapon as
seemingly harmless as the computer, cyberterrorists have at their fingertips a
medium that allows them to cause great damage with minor consequence (Gorge
2007). Files can be stolen and corrupted, computer viruses can be spread, and these
are all due to the easy access provided by the Internet. In some cases, a multiplied
threat exists when the attacker is a former employee, familiar with the computer
network, and wishing to cause harm (Misra 2003). The destruction of websites,
knowingly crashing selected networks, causing denial of service in crisis situations,
spreading malicious computer viruses, causing physical destruction and tampering
with financial interactions, all while inducing panic and causing psychological harm
to targets, are all utilized methods commonly known as information warfare (Paul
2008).
This form of attack holds greater appeal than that of the conventional methods
used in the past for many reasons. For example, the costs of such an attack greatly
diminish when, all things considered, the equipment needed for such an attack does
not go beyond that of a computer and an online connection rather than the
traditional weapons of guns or bombs used in terror situations of the past (Weimann
2005). Previous examples of traditional terrorist attacks (carried out in real time)
required massive amounts of organized locations in which attackers utilized
software such as robotic networks that globally hijack any number of targets and
render them helpless (Aaviksoo 2008). It is precisely this lack of physical presence
in regard to a target that provides a foundation for the rationale behind why
cyberterrorism is a preferred method.
A high level of anonymity comes with a lack of borders, barriers, and authority
that leaves an attacker virtually without consequence to target anyone or anything
across the globe (Weimann 2005). This notion reflects the idea that crimes
committed via computers are of a global nature in which unleashing worms and
viruses that steal information are not limited on a small scale, but can occur between
entire countries and nations when attackers are given free rein to commit crimes
internationally, against individuals, corporations, and governments (Cassell 2006).
Western infrastructures have been a primary target; so have highly populated areas,
which will remain primary venues that become susceptible to attacks (Gunaratna
2005). Combined with the notion that cyberterrorism is both inexpensive and
anonymous, as well as remote, an attacker is not forced into physically demanding
high-risk situations; nor do they have to be as crafty to outwit security systems
(Weimann 2005).
The rationale for the occurrence of cyberterrorism has included that of political
motivation (Baudrillard 2002). When emblematic western infrastructures such as
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banks, hotels, and utilities are considered, the sheer volume of targets becomes
endless, causing the focus for an attacker to switch to a strategic nature, where the
motivation for an attack is fueled by the amount of damage that can be done
(Gunaratna 2005). An appealing factor in the equation of cyberterrorism is that the
attacks are conducted from a location removed from the target (Weimann 2005). An
attacker can handpick a target based on vulnerability in various areas of
government, health, commerce, and utilities (Brown 2006). Examples that fall
under the assertion of causing damage from a remote location could be that of an
attacker opening a dam and releasing flood waters, causing a nuclear power plant
meltdown, or causing an oil pipeline to burst (Brownlie 1963). Because these
utilities are run on complex computer systems, there is a vulnerability that is easy
for an attacker to penetrate and exploit (Weimann 2005). For this reason, the shift
from traditional methods of attack to the more modern form of cyberterrorism is
appealing because physical demands are diminished, the risk of death decreases, and
the amount of time contributed by an attacker has less of a psychological effect.
This, in turn, eases the burden for terror organizations to maintain the number of
members dedicated to the cause (Weimann 2005).
Lastly, and most importantly, there is a media motivational aspect for attackers
(Weimann 2005). As a concrete example of the motivation derived from media
attention, in cases such as the I LOVE YOU virus, a virus that caused an estimated
$10 billion in damages on 350,000 computers in over 20 different countries (Deal,
Gage and Schueneman 2001), the media coverage garnered from that incident was
larger in volume than could be expected had the incident occurred in one place
(Subramanya and Lakshminarasimhan 2001). When each incident is covered with
such depth by the media, an inflated sense of importance and meaning is attributed
to each attack.
1.1.2 Cyberterrorism: a semiotic perspective
Cyberterrorist acts can be carried out through the Internet, a public communication
channel. Cyberterrorism is publicized and propagated via new media communica-
tion. Consequently, it is fundamentally through semiotics and the exploitation of
new media that cyberterrorists find success in achieving their chief goals. Semiotics
is the study of signs (Berger 1989; Chandler 2002; Luskin 1996; No¨th 1995; Sebeok
1994). A sign is something that stands for something else or that can be created to
represent something else (Deely 1990; Peirce 1934). The Internet is a sign system; it
is an astronomical assemblage of codes and images thanks to which users can
construct meanings and symbols. According to semioticians, humans do not face a
‘‘simple’’ objective reality. Rather, what humans see are signs and symbols within a
communication framework, whereby the communication of messages is deemed
quintessential to the creation of meaning (Fiske 1982). From this vantage point,
meaning is not absolute; nor is it static. Meaning is an active process subject to
constant transformation (Benford 1998).
Now that there is a foundation for understanding exactly what cyberterrorism is
and the scope—both concrete and symbolic—it encompasses, a focus on the
communicative aspect is warranted. It is not enough to know that these attacks are
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occurring. One must seek to uncover not only the method of communication, but
also the meaning behind the communication. One note to mention when attempting
to analyze the ‘‘intent’’ of another is the very concept of ‘‘intent.’’ When talking
about motives, one must keep in mind that such a concept is intangible and as such
will be immeasurable. As scholars who are not exactly certain of the exact motive
behind the actions of an individual, we must examine overall behavior to tease out
patterns and analyze the symbolic meaning behind those actions. In doing so, an
understanding of propaganda is needed to place symbolic meaning in context.
1.2 Uses of propaganda: general perspectives
Throughout the vast history of war, there have been many documented cases in
which propaganda has been used as a catalyst for empowering terror organizations
and providing them motivation for large-scale operations or attacks. By definition,
propaganda is a mode of communication aiming at swaying the attitude of people
toward some cause (Bernays and Miller 2004). For example, propaganda ignited
motivation during wartime to increase membership in the armed forces (Lasswell
1971). It was also used as a means of trickery (Krippendorff and Bock 2008), as a
way to or to gain a tactical advantage against the enemy (George 1959) or, most
importantly, as a way to dehumanize the enemy by creating a realm of ‘‘the other’’
(Keen 1991). Verton (2003) explains that
al-Qaeda cells now operate with the assistance of large databases containing
details of potential targets in the US. They use the Internet to collect
intelligence on those targets, especially critical economic nodes, and modern
software enables them to study structural weaknesses in facilities as well as
predict the cascading failure effect of attacking certain systems (p. 109).
This Internet-based approach is considered postmodern, where the premise is that
communication is directionless and leadership is not needed, nor does it exist
(Matusitz 2008a, b). The Internet serves as the perfect medium for the trajectory of
the modern terrorist: the cyberterrorist. While the tool (the Internet) has been
indentified, previous research by Conway (2002) and Weimann (2006) shows that
primary means of communication, intentional or otherwise, between cyberterrorist
and their targets happen through a variety of employed propaganda. Jowell and
O’Donnell (2006) state that ‘‘propaganda is the deliberate, systematic attempt to
shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response
that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist’’ (p. 7).
The portrayal of the ‘‘other’’ (i.e., enemy) through propaganda is a method in
which negative messages become continuously perpetuated. As such, the formation
of in-groups occurs, which allows for beliefs and expectations to form and laws to
emerge that dictate how the enemy is portrayed. Once these perceptions of an
enemy form, they add motivation behind an attack (Keen 1991). When there is talk
about ‘‘the other,’’ entire cultures become faceless, nameless, feeling-less entities
that are the target of violence, and hate (Keen 1991). The language used in World
War II propaganda consisted of ‘‘us’’ versus ‘‘them’’ mentality messages with terms
such as ‘‘Commie bear,’’ ‘‘Nazi Swine,’’ and ‘‘Dog of Capitalism’’ (Keen 1991,
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p. 86), all of which dehumanize a given target. Because the use of propaganda is so
powerful, it is important to understand how these various types of propaganda are
effective, exactly what types are available for use and what is the driving force
behind that power.
In regards to the question of power, Keen (1991) suggests that propagandist
messages involve certain influential indicators that influence the subconscious
psyche of a culture. To begin, it is essential to recognize the media as a strong and
prominent outlet for terrorists to communicate propaganda (Cowen 2006). Another
prominent medium in which propaganda is used as a means of communication is
through the Internet (Hoffman 2003). A traditional method of terrorist communi-
cation previously employed was the use of video as a quick and effective method of
relaying terrorist messages. In addition to the main focus of the use of video being a
cheap and easy means of distributing propaganda for their cause, a more aggressive
and destructive utilization of propaganda using the computer and Internet is through
virus spreading (Weimann 2006). In the first half of 2005, documented worldwide
cyber attacks from viruses reached a recorded 237, a 50 % increase from the same
time period, 1 year earlier (Hoopes 2005).
Propaganda that follows the traditional model instructs an attacker to spend time
effectively gathering intelligence on specific targets as a way to ensure that the
maximum amount of damage that could possibly occur actually comes to fruition in
each incident (Mathieu 2007). Certain tactics that are put into place start with
extensive target analysis, intelligence gathering, and a network of command and
control are considered necessities when attacking a target. All of these are designed
to utilize many different directions to assault a target (Desouza and Hensgen 2003).
The merging of traditional methods of attack with modern ones can be reflected in
the way cyberterrorists pinpoint targets through the use of computers and by way of
propaganda, recruitment, collection of data and information gathering, and member-
to-member communication—through forums and videos via the Internet (Weimann
2006). An even more in-depth scope of these computer-based activities includes
message posting, launching campaigns of a psychological nature, gathering
information on potential targets, allowing for the synchronization of agendas and
actions, allotting funds to specific areas, and using videos to conduct virtual terror
training (Tzfati and Weimann 2002).
Continuing on with the understanding of the role of the media in current terrorist
operations, it has been recognized that the media can manipulate and form desired
images in respect to the minds of the public (Laqueur 2006). The example of the I
LOVE YOU virus was a prime opportunity for media coverage on a massive scale.
Such immense media coverage empowers terrorist organizations and provides
motivation for continued attacks. Publicity and media are considered a necessity in
the world of cyberterrorism, outlining two of the primary themes in the motivation
of the attackers. Jenkins (1975) proposes that
propaganda terrorist attacks are often carefully choreographed to attract the
attention of the electronic media and the international press. Taking and
holding hostages increases the drama. The hostages themselves often mean
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nothing to the terrorists. Terrorism is aimed at the people watching, not at the
actual victims. Terrorism is a theater (p. 4).
With the suggestion of the motives of terrorism rooted in theatrics, it is akin to
suggesting that to be recognized in a highly visible and memorable way is the
purpose for the attack, qualities that are often attributed to media coverage (Cowen
2006). What is meant by terrorism ‘‘as theater’’ or Debord’s (2005) terrorism ‘‘as
spectacle’’ is not an exclusive activity reserved only for a selected group, rather a
particular and precise display intended for an audience from one end of the
spectrum to the other; much like a sporting event or a performance (Cowen 2006).
These ‘‘theatrical’’ qualities—lack of regulation, easy access, vast range of
audiences, and rapid information transfer—have allowed the goals of terrorists to
be achieved, an increasingly attractive option when terror via the Internet allows for
easy causing of damage with decreased fear of getting caught (Rogers 2003).
Terrorist messages such as these are clearly heard worldwide due to well-developed
and well-dispersed media contacts (Kim et al. 2002).
Similarly, Internet sites produce numerous opportunities for in-group commu-
nication and publicity, documenting a trend that encapsulates cause for organiza-
tions (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001a, b; Arquilla, Ronfeldt and Zanini 1999). The US
State Department generated a list of terrorist organizations that confirmed that at
least half of the known listed organizations have websites that are used for the
solicitation of money and membership as well as a way for coded messages to make
its way among group members (Gordon and Ford 2002). Internet provides the
luxury of nonphysical contact with another member of the group where new recruits
can become affiliated and commit to carrying out terrorist attacks, never actually
leaving the comfort of home. In short, the use of propaganda has become the
standard norm among terror groups (Harmon 2001).
Terrorist organizations require backing from supporters in the areas of both
recruiting for membership and funding in order to continue to operate. Another use
for propaganda is to discredit enemies (in the form of creating ‘‘the other’’) all while
placing the organizations in a positive light. Traditional propaganda techniques such
as leaflets and publications in newspapers have now been replaced by the use of
websites for financial backing and membership recruiting (Wright 1991). These
leaflets and newspapers are truly an artifact of the past with the United States
Department of State reported as early as 1999, that over one-third of the known
Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTOs) had their own website (McGirk 1999).
1.3 Uses of propaganda: examples of cyberterrorist groups
Popular radical groups of international significance such as Hezbollah, the
Lebanese-based Shi’ite Islamic group (Conway 2002), operate Internet sites and
use this outlet for various purposes such as posting articles or agendas of upcoming
events, or to publish recently filmed videos, which can be accessed by anybody in
the global cyber community (Deutsch 1996). Cyberterrorist organizations also
feature disappearing and reappearing message boards and websites (Weimann
2006). One attacker, playing cat-and-mouse games with authorities through his
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websites, known as Irhabi007, emerged over the Internet as a leader of an online
terrorist organization. His signature included online videos with instructions for
home-made car bombs, and he also led forums criticizing American foreign policy,
only to take them down and repost or list them under a different domain name
(Fulghum 2005).
In November of 2005, as a tribute to a suicide bomber involved in the attacks on
London, a full-length propaganda video entitled ‘‘The Martyrdom Will of
Mohammad Sidique Khan’’ was posted by another terrorist group known as
Sahaab—an arm of al-Qaeda—launched on the now-unresponsive website,
www.as-sahaab.com. The video bore unassailable similarities to Irhabi007’s fun-
damental Islamist message board that had recently disappeared prior to the attack
(Kohlmann 2006). Copycat websites playing the same cat-and-mouse games began
to spring up after Irhabi007’s capture in 2005, with messages such as the following:
‘‘The enemies of Allah will continuously [try to close down] our website…We ask
you to register for our mailing list so that you continue to receive the latest news of
the Islamic Army in Iraq.’’ This post urged followers to continue their membership
with the organization, despite seemingly inoperable websites (Kohlmann 2006).
Ultimately causing violent methods of destruction, Internet messages commu-
nicated between those cyberterrorist groups display consistent themes ranging from
hate to anger (Talbot 2005). Attackers need a starting place. In order to inflict the
most damage possible, an attacker needs to research various potential for damage in
the process of building a target profile (Mathieu 2007). In order to utilize the
Internet to its fullest extent, cyberterrorists can access a multitude of international
areas and databases that contain sensitive information, such as libraries. Starting
with access to legally obtained information, through legitimate search engines such
as Google, attackers can gather information in the form of maps, satellite images,
uploaded pictures and videos, and other texts available in seemingly harmless and
innocent ways available in a public domain (Paul 2008). Browsing the Internet to
gain information allows attackers to start building profiles against targets using
simple resources that are also very much legal. Once the information-gathering
process on a target has been completed and is recorded, an attacker can then use the
Internet as a channel for carrying out the attack. The Internet, by way of computers,
is the main tool available for assailants to coordinate and communicate on the
method of attack (Paul 2008).
Encryption programs can be implemented to cover any harmful wrongdoing that
could potentially be exposed throughout the course of the operation and, as this is
being done, a system of hidden messages can be put into place (Paul 2008). Many of
these messages range content-wise going so far to include instructions, step-by-step
illustrated renderings of how an attack should be carried out, and detailed
communicated plans enclosed in a secure network that requires a designated
password to access. US Military computers have shown evidence of being a popular
and frequent target by attackers. In 1998, cyberterrorists cracked into computers
used by the Pentagon, using these methods of attack, and downloaded technical
materials sensitive in nature (Lenzner and Vardi 2007). After a federal investigation,
the source of the attacks proved to be a Moscow-based series of dial-up connections.
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The investigation, dubbed Moonlight Maze, was ineffective in catching the
attackers.
The success of the terrorist group is directly correlated with keeping membership
levels at a maximum, and as such, multiple methods of recruiting new members are
a major focal point in the propaganda-based messages that are employed (Liu 2000).
In past efforts to increase membership among groups, traditional methods of
recruitment, such as published written work, audio–video tapes, CDs, and even local
prayer leaders, have been employed as a means of promoting the cause (Paul 2008).
The Internet, an updated and modern element of global terrorism, is emerging with
websites and electronic forums that are used to spread ideological messages and
provide hyperlinks between current operatives in cyberspace in addition to sharing
graphic images depicting previous successes as a call to action for potential new
members (Cronin 2006). In some instances, donations from sponsors or patrons are
requested for those who wish to be supportive without being directly involved
(Cronin 2006). The content of the websites offer a lesson on the history of the
organization, and the cause the organization supports with the intent of enticing new
members to join (Paul 2008). These websites also provide a venue for cyberter-
rorists to plan attacks by using a variety of methods that could not be achieved
through other means.
The use of video provides another powerful arena utilized by terrorists. Video has
been a vital part in the process of propaganda that is cheap and globally accessible
(Weimann 2006). Films depicting anything from the morale-boosting success of
radical fighters to the more macabre and disconcerting videos of executions,
ambushes, and roadside bombings have emerged at a steady and continuous pace,
being systematically distributed across the world (Kohlmann 2006). Terrorist group
Zarqawi’s media chief, Abu Mayasara, displays the power of online videos when he
posted, in a forum, an online insurgent video of high-ranking members of Zarqawi’s
organization beheading American businessman Nicholas Berg (Glasser and Coll
2005). Mere weeks after that video was posted, additional copycat beheading videos
trying to achieve the same gruesome effect as Zarqawi’s conquest and dozens of
new unidentified Arabic-language message boards appeared rapidly on radical
Islamist websites across the Internet (Kohlmann 2006).
The main difference in film distribution, to compare past methods to present day,
is that in previous years, the videos, produced and distributed in traceable brick-and-
mortar establishments, allowed for easy identification and easy prosecution of
offenders, whereas present-day operations are postmodern and join Internet access
with software designed for video editing and virtually untraceable upload
capabilities (Kohlmann 2006).
In addition to easy access and virtual inability to be traced back to any one
criminal, an appeal for the use of propaganda lies heavily in the ability to induce
fear on a grand scale, affecting a multitude of people. Participants who were
exposed to clips of terrorism and threats to national security developed higher
anxiety than those who were not exposed to such clips, according to one study
(Slone 2000). Perfidy or betrayal is an applicable outcome to the use of videos that
rely on deceitful methods because of a reliance on outcomes that are psycholog-
ically damaging, allowing for a tactical advantage to be achieved (Dinstein 2004).
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Damaging and deceitful perfidy could be explained in a more detailed manner in
regard to video, when the false construction or the blatant alteration of images or
recordings occurs specifically to make a false claim against a party (Army Field
Manual 1956). By extension, videos communicate a message to members of an
organization and are used for purposes of displaying examples of previous
successful attacks on a grand scale.
Another example of the deceitful nature in the form of damaging messages
communicated through video comes to light when a multitude of videos are altered
to express meaning that had not been originally intended (Slone 2000). Documented
cases have exhibited modified and forged footage, such as falsely spliced voice
recordings that depict an enemy head of state issuing orders for war crimes, or
digitally altered state uniforms that have been changed to resemble enemy attire
(Shulman 1999). Tactics such as these create consequences that are short term and
steeped in deceit of a political nature. The consequences that occur long term—that
of increased fatalities, extended periods of war, and schisms in the restoration of
peace—destroy any foundation of peace that have been gained previously (Army
Field Manual 1956). Additionally, propaganda allows for the perpetuation of ‘‘the
other,’’ continuing the mindset of damaging nationalistic pride which ‘‘is the
language of blood: a call to arms which can end in the horrors of ethnic cleansing’’
(Billig 1995, p. 48).
To date, evidence suggests that through means of technology—video, internet,
and media coverage—messages through propaganda are worthy of mention because
of the implications they carry from a communicative perspective. It has been
suggested that restricted media coverage of terrorist attacks would in turn decrease
the amount of terrorist attacks that occur afterward because a primary communi-
cative intent—media coverage and recognition—was not being met (Cowen 2006).
If this is the case, an interesting perspective to look for in the data would be the ties
that connect the media, propaganda, and the communicative messages that are being
conveyed.
1.4 Combining semiotics and propaganda in a case study of cyberterrorism
This section provides a semiotic analysis of a case study of cyberterrorist
propaganda and gives an explanation as to how the cyberterrorist act works both as a
symbol and as terrorism. The case study focuses on a propagandist act committed by
the World Fantabulous Defacers (WFD). This organization is a Middle-Eastern
alliance of 12 cyberterrorist groups strongly opposed to the Indian presence in
Kashmir and the occupation of Palestine by Israel. They have been reported in the
news for wreaking havoc on websites (Aparna, Bolli and Bock 2008). In 2002,
WFD hacked into the official website of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and
defaced it, causing thousands of dollars in damage. As a title, they wrote, ‘‘The Face
of the World’s Biggest Murderer’’ (Verton 2003). They also inserted a dreadful
picture of an injured Palestinian child and propagandist statements such as ‘‘Long
Live Hizballah! Long Live Palestine! Long Live Chechnya, Kashmir, Kosovo, and
Bosnia!’’ (Bunt 2003). At the bottom of the website, they incorporated a message
with the signature of the group (Verton 2003).
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The WFD’s hacking into Sharon’s official website illustrates the misdeed of a
cyberterrorist group that had the capability to do far more damage and potentially
create a national crisis in Israel (Verton 2003). Put simply, their misdeed constitutes
a semiotic act encapsulated in messages and a horrific photo. By gaining such
visibility, terrorists are now able to proliferate terror in cyberspace and evoke fear.
While militant Palestinians blow up Israeli buildings, they can also use the Internet
to cause harm to their enemies. This very attack was carried out by Palestinians
sympathetic to their particular cause. Fear was generated and destruction was
caused out of a political intent. The very act of defacing the Israeli Prime Minister’s
official website may have caused thousands of dollars in damage, but, according to
Bunt (1999, 2003), another objective of WFD was to diffuse Islamic supremacy.
It is fundamentally through semiotics and the exploitation of new media that the
World Fantabulous Defacers found success in spreading propaganda. Semiotics is a
tool to decode signs, their meanings and associations, and their evolution. The
evolution, in this case study, is translated in a shift from traditional propaganda to
e-propaganda (Karagiannis and Wagner 2007). Mandaville (2001) identifies a
significant relationship between the Internet and Islamism. He points to the
digitalization of Islamic terrorism. The Internet, it seems, has become an inseparable
tool of Islamism. On the bright side, semiotics can also be an efficient tool for
scholars and experts to detect and defeat cyber threats (Desouza and Hensgen 2005).
2 Results and future directions
What this analysis has demonstrated is that cyberterrorists exploit diverse semiotic
gestures, through the use of images and Internet videos, to communicate their
intents to the public at large. In doing so, cyberterrorists communicate themes that
range from hate to anger. From this vantage point, cyberterrorism is a form of
theater or spectacle in which terrorists benefit from the endless opportunities that
cyberspace offers to generate feelings of panic and overreaction in the target
population. Cyberterrorism is a semiotic act; be it a message, a symbol, or an image
on a website. Our computer-based universe is wrapped up with images, signs, and
symbols. Truly, there is a powerful semiotic dimension to cyberterrorism.
So, through propagandist gestures and the use of various symbolic systems,
cyberterrorists are capable of communicating their intents. The intent is to utilize
any output necessary to play upon the fears to the public and by association,
enhancing the power cyberterrorists wield. More specifically, this output is
represented in coverage by the media generating increased attention and heightening
the theatrical element behind each attack. Our society is wrapped up with images,
signs, and symbols. Given this, there is a powerful semiotic dimension to
cyberterrorism. Without a doubt, it can involve sending images of fear. We saw it
with the cyberterrorist act committed by the World Fantabulous Defacers (WFD) in
2002. It is essentially by means of semiotics and the utilization of new media that
WFD managed to successfully spread their propagandist messages. In like fashion,
the full-length propaganda video entitled ‘‘The Martyrdom Will of Mohammad
Sidique Khan’’ was posted by another terrorist group known as Sahaab—an arm of
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al-Qaeda—launched on the now-unresponsive website, www.as-sahaab.com. The
creators of the video had one goal in mind: to instill feelings of panic in viewers,
through powerful images (Kohlmann 2006).
Also demonstrated is a carefully crafted network of Internet savvy members of
cyberterrorist organizations who communicate power and status through online
video clips, websites, and through methods of destruction ranging from the
malicious (denial of service) to the irreparably devastating (death). The motives of
cyberterrorists are the same as those of conventional terrorists: to send images
of fear. In the same way that terrorism is, first and foremost, a process of
communication between terrorists and target audiences (Tuman 2003), a key
objective of cyberterrorists is as old as the one by conventional terrorists: to send a
powerful signal whose meaning is intended to frighten and to coerce.
The interesting notion, as mentioned before with the cat-and-mouse nature of
Islamist cyberterrorist Irhabi007 (Kohlmann 2006), is that these terrorist websites
are frequently put up and taken down so they can cause their damage and still be
maintained for another day. The general scope for the use of websites is so vast that
they provide a forum, or a safe haven for any level of content that a cyberterrorist
feels is necessary to air to keep motivation for the cause intact, for reasons of
member recruitment or to raise funds from supporters. While the primary goal of
terrorism is a process of communication between terrorists and target audiences
(Tuman 2003), cyberterrorism also seeks to send a powerful signal meant to frighten
and coerce the target. This analysis detailed the various motivations behind small-
and large-scale targets and the emotional aspects of fear for safety and lack of faith
in the government that accrues from being targeted.
For future research, it might prove interesting to continue investigating the
relationship between cyberterrorism and new media (i.e., Internet and other
information technologies). Without the existence of these, cyberterrorism is doomed
to failure. In fact, scholars should examine the two following questions: How
different would cyberterrorism be without semiotics? And what would cyberter-
rorism be without Internet-facilitated propaganda? The use of communication
technologies by cyberterrorists is an essential requirement for the success of their
propagandist and semiotic gestures. In order to cause massive overreaction from the
public, cyberterrorists rely on those new media to agitate the target population by
exploiting images that, once produced, can be exploited again later and be re-used to
new effect.
As we can see, cyberterrorism represents a mighty tool of communication,
persuasion, and propaganda. Since billions of human beings are becoming
increasingly interconnected through computers and the Internet, cyberspace creates
both benefits and disadvantages for human communities. The danger of cyberter-
rorism is real; though it has been underestimated by many, it can add a great deal to
our anxieties.
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